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Notes
ANOTHER HURDLE TO HABEAS:
THE STREAMLINED PROCEDURES ACT
MICHELLE HERTZ
INTRODUCTION
Shortly before midnight on December 12, 2005, California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger denied clemency to Crips gang
founder and convicted quadruple murderer Stanley “Tookie”
Williams on the eve of his execution.1 Schwarzenegger delivered his
decision amidst an explosive public dispute over capital punishment.
Yet underneath this visible controversy lurked a constitutional issue
that failed to draw the same degree of popular concern but has been
stirring the judicial system for decades: the filing of successive
petitions for habeas corpus.
In Williams’s case, Pasadena lawyer Verna Wefald issued an
eleventh-hour emergency plea to the U.S. Supreme Court,
2
accompanied by a 150-page habeas petition. Wefald’s petition—
alleging “an ‘error of constitutional magnitude [that] led to a trial that
was so fundamentally unfair absent the error [that] no reasonable
judge or jury would have convicted’ [Williams]”3—followed five
similar requests to state and federal courts. The first habeas petition,
4
filed with the California Supreme Court in 1984, alleged various Fifth

Copyright © 2007 by Michelle Hertz.
1. See Williams v. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 979, 988, 994 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (addressing
Williams’s conviction). Williams died by lethal injection at 12:35 a.m. on Dec. 13, 2005, hours
after Schwarzenegger denied clemency. See, e.g., Jenifer Warren & Maura Dolan, Tookie
Williams Is Executed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, at A1.
2. Henry Weinstein, Williams’ Lawyer Appeals to Supreme Court: Constitutional Issues
Challenging the Validity of His Convictions and Death Sentence Are Raised in Request for a Stay
of Execution, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at B8.
3. Id.
4. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (listing Williams’s successive attempts at habeas relief).
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5
and Sixth Amendment violations during Williams’s trial. This
6
petition was denied in 1988. A second state habeas petition, filed
January 9, 1989, was also denied.7 Williams filed his third state
petition on September 1, 1989, and his fourth on April 14, 1994; both
8
were denied. Subsequently, Williams filed a federal habeas petition,
amended on November 13, 1995, arguing that he had been
9
incompetent during his trial. Thus, courts repeatedly considered one
defendant’s conviction for eleven years.
Critics are sharply divided over the appropriate amount of time
and resources that courts should devote to habeas review. Scholars
who oppose extensive habeas protections argue that lengthier
procedures congest courts, divert resources from other claims, and
10
stall victims’ ability to heal and move on. Habeas supporters respond
by emphasizing the need for judicial process and fairness, especially
11
when a human life is at stake. The U.S. Supreme Court has
attempted to define the boundaries of what is required to ensure full
and fair process. Congress also interjected its own legislation, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),12
which was, until 2005, the legislature’s latest effort toward foreclosing
habeas relief.
In 2005, Arizona Republican Senator Jon L. Kyl introduced new
legislation that would have further blocked what is already an
obstructed path toward habeas relief.13 The Streamlined Procedures

5. See People v. Williams, 751 P.2d 901, 908–11 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s
arguments that (1) police attained unsolicited incriminating statements from the defendant, (2)
police violated the defendant’s Miranda rights, and (3) the defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel).
6. Id. at 921.
7. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
8. See Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (noting denial of the fourth state petition); In re
Williams (Williams II), 870 P.2d 1072, 1095 (Cal. 1994) (denying the third state petition).
9. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
10. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 367, 367 (1983) (listing various motives for limiting habeas review).
11. See id. (including factors favoring broad habeas availability).
12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
13. 151 CONG. REC. S5540–44 (daily ed. May 19, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl introducing
the Streamlined Procedures Act).
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14
Act (SPA) garnered support from politicians who believed that
AEDPA failed to simplify habeas doctrine, yet it faced fiery
opposition from its critics.15 Predictably, an individual’s stance on the
proposal embodied in this Act reflects personal views of what is
important in the judicial process: precise finality or ultimate
protection.
Although it is necessary to strike a balance between these two
competing interests, the SPA’s clear preference for finality was
unwarranted and even unconstitutional. Congress was wise not to
adopt this legislation, which would have curtailed protections to an
undesirable minimum and impeded well-established avenues of relief
approved by the Supreme Court. This Note focuses on the changes in
the specific habeas doctrine of procedural default. Part I provides the
judicial and statutory development of habeas law. Part II outlines the
goals of the Streamlined Procedures Act as proposed in 2005. Finally,
Part III discusses how the plan proposed in the Act would effectively
eradicate habeas relief and leave certain constitutional violations
unremedied.

I. DEFINING HABEAS AND THE
DOCTRINE OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
When a prisoner is held in violation of the Constitution, treaties,
or laws of the United States, that individual may petition for federal
habeas relief.16 Upon receiving the habeas petition, a federal court
may examine the trial court’s criminal conviction.17 If the conviction is
held unconstitutional, the federal habeas court may discharge the

14. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005). Representative
Daniel E. Lungren (R-CA) sponsored analogous legislation in the House of Representatives.
Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. (2005).
15. The last congressional action on the Streamlined Procedures Act was a Senate
Judiciary Committee hearing on Nov. 16, 2005. Bill Summary and Status for the 109th CongressS. 1088 (Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d
109:s.01088: (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). Although the SPA failed in the 109th Congress, if its
steadfast supporters propose similar legislation in the future, this may implicate many of the
same issues raised in this Note.
16. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 862 (4th ed. 2003). Habeas relief
applies to individuals in custody following both state trials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000),
and federal trials, pursuant to § 2255.
17. Federal habeas review is a form of collateral relief, which differs from direct review of
state court decisions. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 862 (explaining that a habeas
“petition constitutes a separate civil suit filed in federal court”).
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18
prisoner from custody. By releasing a prisoner held on a state court
judgment, the federal habeas court “renders ineffective” the state law
ground pursuant to which the judgment rested.19
To promote the goals of federalism and comity, the Supreme
Court held that, “in a federal system, the [s]tates should have the first
opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state
prisoner[s’] federal rights.”20 Specifically, habeas petitioners must first
exhaust their claims in state court before submitting them for federal
review. A petitioner who fails to raise a particular issue before the
lower courts “has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to
address [that claim] in the first instance,”21 a principle known as
“procedural default.” These claims are generally barred from habeas
22
review.

A. Origins of Habeas and Subsequent Developments
Habeas doctrine is expressly grounded in the U.S. Constitution.
Article I, Section 9 affirms, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”23 Under the Judiciary Act
of 1789, Congress granted federal courts authority to permit habeas
24
for federal prisoners only. Later, following the Civil War, Congress
extended to state prisoners the ability to seek habeas corpus relief if
they were held “in violation of the constitution, or of any law or
treaty of the United States.”25 Despite these early statutory

18. Id.
19. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991).
20. Id. at 731.
21. Id. at 732.
22. Id. at 731. Procedurally defaulted claims are barred from subsequent habeas review
unless they fall within one of two articulated exceptions. First, petitioner may succeed by
demonstrating “cause” and “prejudice” for the procedural default. Second, a federal court may
review such procedurally defaulted claims if petitioner has been subjected to a “fundamental
miscarriage of justice.” See infra Part I.A.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 868.
25. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(2000)); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 862 (stating that this extension of habeas
rights stemmed from Congress’s distrust of state courts’ “ability and willingness . . . to protect
federal rights”).
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expansions, habeas law evolved primarily through judicial
26
decisionmaking.
The Supreme Court has viewed habeas corpus as a tool for
combating wrongful imprisonments and “convictions that violate
27
‘fundamental fairness.’” In 1963, the Court advocated this
28
protectionist stance in Fay v. Noia. By allowing “individual[s]
convicted in state court [to] raise on habeas issues that were not
presented at trial, unless it [could] be demonstrated that he or she
29
deliberately chose to bypass the state procedures,” the Fay Court
solidified its position that “a[n] [unintentional] forfeiture of remedies
does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by which . . . [a]
30
conviction was procured.”
This lenient gateway toward habeas relief was ultimately
replaced by a more rigorous standard. In 1977, in Wainwright v.
31
Sykes, the Court retracted its earlier focus on fundamental fairness
and emphasized the need for efficiency and respect for state
32
procedural rules. Implicitly overruling Fay, the Court held that
claims not raised in state court can be presented for habeas review in
federal courts only if there is good “cause” for the omission, and even
then, only if the omission resulted in “prejudice.” By adopting the
“cause and prejudice” doctrine, the Court aimed to “mak[e] the state
trial on the merits the ‘main event,’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the
road’ for what will later be the determinative federal habeas
hearing.”33

26. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991), superseded by statute, AEDPA of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
27. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (“Today, as in prior centuries, the writ is a
bulwark against convictions that violate ‘fundamental fairness.’” (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977))).
28. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991).
29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 906.
30. Id. at 907.
31. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
32. See id. at 81 (“[I]t is a well-established principle of federalism that a state decision
resting on an adequate foundation of state substantive law is immune from review in the federal
courts.”).
33. Id. at 90. The Court explained that this standard “will afford an adequate guarantee . . .
that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the
federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be
the victim of a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 90–91.
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Although subsequent Supreme Court decisions followed this
34
35
reasoning, it was not until Coleman v. Thompson in 1991 that the
Court expressly overruled Fay and held that issues of procedural
36
default must be decided under the “cause and prejudice” standard.
In Coleman, the Court espoused the goal of finality and sought to
preserve the integrity and legitimacy of the state court system by
allowing only two exceptions for petitioners who defaulted in state
court. The first exception allows review of defaulted claims if the
petitioner “can demonstrate [1] cause for the default and [2] actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.”37 Second,
petitioners may overcome the bar against such claims if they can
“demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a
38
fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Despite the availability of these exceptions, the presumption
against procedurally defaulted claims still bars most petitions for
habeas relief. The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the “cause
and prejudice” and “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standards,
39
and these exceptions remain vague and difficult to prove. Although
40
the Wainwright Court failed to define these terms, subsequent
decisions provide insight into what is “sufficient ‘cause’ to excuse a
state court procedural default and permit a habeas corpus petitioner
to raise matters not presented in the state courts.”41
42
In Engle v. Isaac, for example, the Court attempted to delineate
what constitutes cause for a procedural default. In Engle, a petitioner
sought habeas review of the constitutionality of jury instructions
34. E.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 99 U.S. 467, 493–94 (1991), superseded by statute, AEDPA of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
128–29 (1982).
35. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
36. Id. at 750.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488 (“Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such
objective impediments [constituting ‘cause’], we note that a showing that the factual or legal
basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel or that ‘some interference by officials’
made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this standard.” (citations
omitted)).
40. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91 (1977) (“Whatever precise content may be
given those terms by later cases, we feel confident in holding without further elaboration that
they do not exist here.”).
41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 911.
42. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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43
delivered at his Ohio state trial. At the conclusion of petitioner’s
initial trial, the judge instructed the jury that petitioner bore the
burden of proving self defense by a preponderance of the evidence.44
At that time, Ohio state courts typically required such a burden of
45
proof for affirmative defenses. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently held that, due to this mistaken but established state
practice, any objection to the burden of proof would have been
futile.46 This futility constituted cause for petitioner’s waiver at trial,
and petitioner had been prejudiced by the judge’s incorrect assertion
47
of the burden of proof.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that
because the defense counsel failed to object at trial, in violation of a
separate Ohio contemporaneous objection rule, the issue could not be
48
presented for habeas review. The Court emphasized its belief that
the costs of foregoing finality outweighed the benefits of providing
habeas relief to individuals imprisoned due to jury instructions that
violated their constitutional rights.49 The Court further noted that

the futility of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot
alone constitute cause for failure to object at trial. If a defendant
perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the
federal courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because he
thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state court
that has previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide,
50
upon reflection, that the contention is valid.

Therefore, although the precise term “cause” still remained
undefined, the Engle Court established that failure to raise an
objection at trial does not sufficiently satisfy the standard.
There has been even less judicial elaboration on the definition of
51
prejudice. The Court held in United States v. Frady that a petitioner
must show that the trial outcome likely would have been different

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 117.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126–29.
Id. at 126–28.
Id. at 130.
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
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52
absent the alleged violation of the Constitution or federal law. This,
too, is a tough standard to meet. The petitioner “must shoulder the
burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a
possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of
constitutional dimensions.”53
Likewise, the Court has attempted to elaborate what constitutes
a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”54 This exception has been
interpreted narrowly to include instances “where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent.”55 Petitioners must present “new reliable evidence”
that was absent at trial, such as DNA evidence or trustworthy
56
eyewitness accounts. Unfortunately, because such evidence is not
often present, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.

B. The First Legislative Hurdle: The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
In 1996, Congress took action in the habeas arena. Addressing a
growing desire for finality in the judicial process, Congress passed a
bill that drastically restricted the availability of habeas relief: The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).57 The
AEDPA imposed a statute of limitations on habeas petitions:
58
prisoners have one year to apply for habeas relief. In addition,
successive habeas petitions are barred unless approved by a U.S.
Court of Appeals.59 The court of appeals may allow a successive
petition only if the petitioner demonstrates either

52. Id. at 170.
53. Id. The burden required to demonstrate that prejudice occurred is greater than the
standard necessary to show “plain error” for direct appeals. Id. at 166.
54. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313–15 (1995) (stating that the petitioner “may obtain
review of his constitutional claims only if he falls within the ‘narrow class of cases . . . implicating
a fundamental miscarriage of justice’” (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991))).
55. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The Court has clarified that “‘actual
innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).
56. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
57. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
59. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
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that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law that applies
retroactively; or if the factual predicate for the claim could not have
been discovered previously and the facts underlying the claim would
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
60
underlying offense.

Finally, courts have described the “key element”61 of the
AEDPA as the provision that limits the scope of habeas review of
62
constitutional claims previously “adjudicated on the merits.” Habeas
relief is not available if a state court simply misapplied constitutional
principles to the particular facts of a case. Rather, relief may be
granted only if the state court ruling was “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”63 or if the
state court adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented.”64 In this way, Congress has tried to limit the
involvement of federal courts in deciding whether to grant habeas
review.
AEDPA supporters applaud the Act for creating a deferential
standard to state court decisions—a standard stemming from
concerns for finality and federalism articulated by the Supreme Court
in developing habeas doctrine.65 Moreover, the restricted scope of
review ultimately decreases the number of habeas petitions saturating
66
federal courts, conserving judicial time and resources. The AEDPA,
however, has exacted severe criticism from those who favor closer
protection of individual rights. AEDPA opponents generally agree
that efficiency is important, but in balancing interests, habeas

60. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 873.
61. Margery Miller, A Different View of Habeas: Interpreting AEDPA’s “Adjudicated on
the Merits” Clause When Habeas Corpus is Understood as an Appellate Function of the Federal
Courts, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2593, 2611 (2004).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[I]f the claim was not ‘adjudicated on the merits,’ the circuits
agree that a federal court should apply the pre-AEDPA standard of review to the claim.”
Miller, supra note 61, at 2612–13.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
64. Id. § 2254(d)(2).
65. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for “Reasonably
Erroneous” Applications of Federal Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 746–47 (2002) (describing
various interpretations of the deferential standard of review).
66. Miller, supra note 61, at 2611.
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67
legislation should promote constitutional protections and thus
ensure fundamental fairness.
As a result of the AEDPA, many assertions of wrongful or
unconstitutional trial court convictions are never reviewed on the
68
merits. Concededly, a strong counterargument exists that a
functioning court system requires finality to allow courts to adjudicate
the entirety of their caseloads. Proponents of this viewpoint might
argue that, unless defendants can prove they are actually innocent of
crimes, there is little to gain by disrupting the finality of the state trial
court’s decision.
Yet a system which relies solely on actual innocence essentially
ignores an entire population of prisoners who were convicted and
69
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution. This Note asserts that
procedural fairness is important for its own sake, even if some of the
individuals afforded constitutional protection are actually guilty of
the underlying crimes. Legislation—such as the AEDPA—that
erodes such protection risks undermining public faith and confidence
in the legal system.

II. A POSSIBLE BLOW TO HABEAS:
THE STREAMLINED PROCEDURES ACT
Senator Kyl proposed legislation in the 109th Congress to narrow
the already constrained scope of federal habeas review.70 The stated
purpose of this legislation, the Streamlined Procedures Act (SPA),
was to implement streamlined procedures for federal courts to follow
on collateral review of habeas petitions, and the Act specifically
addressed procedurally defaulted claims.71 The SPA would have
effectively denied or restricted the jurisdiction of federal courts to
hear habeas corpus petitions that (1) have been procedurally barred
in a state court,72 (2) are based upon errors in sentences or sentencing

67. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 367 (“These advocates regard habeas corpus as
symbolic of a commitment to constitutional values and to the ideal that no person shall be
convicted in violation of the fundamental law of the land.”).
68. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 350 (2006).
69. Id. at 346; see also infra Part III.B.
70. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005).
71. S. 1088 pmbl.
72. Id. § 4.
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73
74
ruled harmless error by a state court, (3) pertain to capital cases, or
(4) challenge the exercise of a “[s]tate’s executive clemency or pardon
power.”75
Essentially, the SPA would have confiscated from federal courts
the jurisdiction over habeas review of both procedurally defaulted
and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.76 In relevant portion, the
SPA mandated that

[a] court, justice, or judge shall not have jurisdiction to consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court with respect to
any claim that was found by the State court to be procedurally
barred, or any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to
such claim, unless . . . the claim would qualify for consideration on
77
the grounds described in [28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)].

To fulfill the criteria of § 2254(e)(2) under the SPA, federal
habeas petitioners would have been required to demonstrate that the
procedurally defaulted claim either (1) relies on a new and
retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law that was unavailable
during petitioner’s initial trial, or (2) rests on factual grounds which
could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence.78 In
addition, habeas petitioners would have borne the burden of showing
that “the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the [petitioner] guilty of the
underlying offense.”79 By incorporating this strict standard, the SPA
would have changed the law of procedural default by barring all
defaulted claims unless the petitioner could show actual innocence of
the underlying crime.80

73. Id. § 6.
74. Id. § 9.
75. Id. § 10(a).
76. See id. § 4(a)(2) (“A court, justice, or judge shall not have jurisdiction to consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . [for] any claim that was found by the State court to be
procedurally barred, or any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .”).
77. Id.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A) (2000).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (2000).
80. See 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (daily ed. May 19, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (describing
how the SPA will permit “procedurally improper claims to go forward only if they present
meaningful evidence that the defendant did not commit the crime”).
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Stressing the need for finality, SPA supporters emphasized that
such legislation was necessary to reduce delays in resolving criminal
81
convictions. Given that many habeas cases take ten or twenty years
to resolve, the sponsors argued that such a bill was necessary to ease
82
the flood of habeas petitions. Moreover, the delays are “deeply
unfair” to victims of serious crimes because they postpone the ability
83
to gain closure. In urging support for the SPA, Senator Kyl stated,
“A parent whose child has been murdered, or someone who has been
the victim of a violent assault, cannot be expected to ‘move on’
without knowing how the case against the attacker has been
resolved.”84
The Act also attempted to combat claimed defects in habeas
review, including the ability of federal habeas courts to “reweigh[]
evidence or entertain[] claims that have not been decided by state
85
courts.” This reflected earlier concerns about defense attorneys
strategically “sandbagging” their claims to preserve arguments for
habeas review.86 Supporters additionally argued that permitting
federal courts to review claims that had procedurally defaulted in

81. Id. Such views have also been expressed in earlier judicial attempts to narrow the scope
of habeas review. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492 (1991) (“‘A procedural system
which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate
certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice . . . .’” (quoting Paul M.
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 441, 452 (1963))), superseded by statute, AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108,
110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982) (“‘[B]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest
in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to
litigation . . . .’” (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))).
82. See 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“Currently, many Federal habeas
corpus cases require 10, 15, or even 20 years to complete.”); see also McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491
(“Federal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on scarce federal judicial resources, and
threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes.”).
83. 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also Marcia Coyle, Congress Looks
at More Limits on Habeas, NAT’L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 1 (noting that Senator Kyl has argued
that there is a “need for closure for victims and their families, which can only be accomplished
by reducing the backlog of habeas petitions”).
84. 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
85. See Coyle, supra note 83.
86. See, e.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491–92 (“[H]abeas corpus review may give litigants
incentives to withhold claims for manipulative purposes and may establish disincentives to
present claims when evidence is fresh.”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (criticizing
that habeas “may encourage ‘sandbagging’ on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their
chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional
claims in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off”).
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state courts “deprives the trial court of an opportunity to correct any
error without retrial, . . . gives state appellate courts no chance to
review trial errors, and . . . undercut[s] the [s]tate’s ability to enforce
87
its procedural rules.” This view has been continually articulated by
courts seeking to restore independent state powers.88 The Supreme
Court stated that “[r]eexamination of state convictions on federal
habeas frustrates . . . both the [s]tates’ sovereign power to punish
offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional
rights.”89 Furthermore, supporters of such habeas restriction argued
that the ability to seek repeated habeas review detracts from the
respect for the trial as the main event. Such liberal availability of
habeas “degrades the prominence of the trial itself.”90
In addition, sponsors promoted the SPA’s ultimate effect:
establishing a uniform standard of reviewing procedurally defaulted
claims.91 All federal courts would be barred from reviewing habeas
petitions unless the petitioner presents meaningful evidence of actual
innocence.92 This would eliminate much of the guesswork undertaken
by states to determine what constitutes good cause and prejudice for
a procedurally defaulted claim.
III. THE INTOLERABLE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE STREAMLINED PROCEDURES ACT
In its attempt to streamline judicial procedures in pursuit of
finality, proposals like the SPA would effectively “strip the federal
courts of what limited jurisdiction they now have over constitutional
habeas claims of state prisoners.”93 Section A discusses how the SPA
nearly eradicated the availability of habeas relief to petitioners.
Section B then addresses the Act’s troubling potential outcome of
leaving victims of constitutional violations without remedies.

87. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986).
88. E.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491 (“Our federal system recognizes the independent
power of a [s]tate to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a [s]tate to
pass laws means little if the [s]tate cannot enforce them.”).
89. Id.
90. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
91. 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (daily ed. May 19, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[T]he SPA
creates uniform, clear procedures for review of procedurally improper claims.”).
92. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
93. Barbara Bergman, Great Writ Endangered, 29 CHAMPION, Oct. 29, 2005, at 4, 4.
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A. The Streamlined Procedures Act Would Effectively Obliterate
Habeas Relief
The most troubling prospect of the SPA was the Act’s
elimination of the cause and prejudice standard. To attain habeas
review of a procedurally defaulted claim under the SPA
requirements, a petitioner must prove that “no reasonable factfinder”
would have found petitioner guilty had the new “factual grounds”
been available during the initial trial. The SPA standard for habeas
review was thus tantamount to a showing of actual innocence via new
reliable evidence. Yet because petitioners rarely possess such
evidence, the Act would have effectively removed habeas as an
option for prisoners held in violation of their constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has frequently articulated that the “actual
94
innocence” standard comprises a narrow exception. In Murray v.
Carrier,95 the Court asserted, “in an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ
even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural
default.”96 In the 1994 case Schlup v. Delo,97 the Court elaborated: a
petitioner must demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred
“probably result[ing] in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent.”98 This requires a petitioner to bring forth “new reliable
evidence” that is virtually dispositive in proving innocence and that
99
was absent at trial. Sufficient new reliable evidence may include
DNA, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or other forms of physical
100
evidence. The Court acknowledged, however, that because such

94. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992) (“[W]e have emphasized the
narrow scope of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.”).
95. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
96. Id. at 496; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 918 (“At most, Herrera v. Collins
stands for the proposition that a habeas petitioner seeking relief by claiming that newly
discovered evidence demonstrates actual innocence has a very heavy burden to meet.”).
97. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
98. Id. at 327. In Schlup, the Court rejected an earlier approach taken in Sawyer, which
required a petitioner to “show by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error
at his sentencing hearing, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death
penalty under [the applicable state] law.” Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 350; see also House v. Bell, 126 S.
Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006) (affirming that “the Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only
in the ‘extraordinary’ case”).
99. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
100. Id.
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exculpatory evidence is absent in most instances, “claims of actual
101
innocence are rarely successful.”
102
For example, the 2006 case of House v. Bell demonstrates the
extensive showing of exculpatory evidence that may be required. In
this case, petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death
103
based on circumstantial evidence. Petitioner sought habeas relief
and presented an extensive amount of new evidence to support his
actual innocence claim.104 Specifically, petitioner offered DNA test
results showing the semen on the victim’s nightgown and panties
105
matched her husband’s DNA rather than the petitioner’s. In
addition, new expert testimony indicated that the blood on
petitioner’s pants was “chemically too degraded” to have come from
the victim on the night of the murder.106 Instead, the expert concluded
that the blood had spilled from the vials of autopsy samples onto
107
petitioner’s jeans. Furthermore, the expert confirmed that the blood
vials had not been properly sealed, had been transported in the same
cardboard box as petitioner’s pants, and a vial and a half had emptied
throughout the ten-hour journey to the FBI laboratory.108
The Supreme Court recognized the main forensic evidence that
linked petitioner to the murder—the semen and blood samples—was
highly dubious. As a result, the Court concluded that House was the
rare case in which the new evidence would likely cause “any
109
reasonable juror [to] have reasonable doubt.” Thus, petitioner’s
compelling claim of actual innocence allowed him to bypass the
procedural bar to habeas relief.

101. Id.; see also Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004) (maintaining that “actual
innocence” is intended to be a narrow standard); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623
(1998) (noting that “actual innocence” is more than “mere legal insufficiency”); Arrington v.
Williams, 195 F. App’x 761, 762 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[F]undamental miscarriages of justice are
‘extremely rare.’” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324)).
102. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
103. See id. at 2071–75 (discussing petitioner’s bruised arms and hands, blood-stained pants,
and semen sample as factors leading to petitioner’s capital murder conviction).
104. See id. at 2078–80 (presenting DNA evidence as well as new expert testimony in
support of his “actual innocence” claim).
105. Id. at 2078–79.
106. See id. at 2080 (describing the Assistant Chief Medical Examiner’s testimony regarding
the decay and enzyme degradation within blood samples).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2077, 2086.
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Yet such extensive exculpatory evidence is seldom available. The
Supreme Court repeatedly expressed the extraordinary nature of
110
Moreover, a
House’s circumstances throughout the opinion.
multitude of other federal habeas cases have denied actual innocence
claims when new reliable evidence was not quite so overwhelming.
For example, in Arrington v. Williams,111 the petitioner presented
evidence that a government witness had committed perjury at
112
petitioner’s trial. Petitioner presented new excerpts from an earlier
hearing indicating that the witness had reached a deal with
prosecutors to testify against petitioner in exchange for a reduction of
his own pending sentence.113 Furthermore, the content of the excerpts
suggested that the witness had mischaracterized the negotiations
114
during petitioner’s trial. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that this new evidence would have solely been useful to impeach the
witness.115 Because impeachment evidence is “a step removed from
evidence pertaining to the crime itself,” such evidence can rarely
116
support a finding of “actual innocence.”
117
In Wadlington v. United States, petitioner supplemented his
habeas petition with affidavits from four individuals who attested to
118
petitioner’s lack of involvement with a drug conspiracy. The
affidavits attacked earlier trial testimony regarding petitioner’s drug
119
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless
activities.
rejected petitioner’s new evidence because “recantations of testimony
120
generally are viewed with suspicion.” Furthermore, there remained
other evidence connecting petitioner to the conspiracy.121
Similarly, the results of new psychological evaluations may not
122
suffice. In Griffin v. Johnson, petitioner presented hospital records
110. E.g., id. at 2068, 2086.
111. Arrington v. Williams, 195 F. App’x 761 (10th Cir. 2006).
112. Id. at 762.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 766.
116. Id. at 764 (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 563 (1998)).
117. Wadlington v. United States, 428 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2005).
118. Id. at 782.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 784; see also Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting new
affidavits which corroborated that petitioner was not at the victim’s residence at the time of the
murder because subsequent exculpatory affidavits are “suspect”).
121. Wadlington, 428 F.3d at 784.
122. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2003).
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to invoke an insanity defense in order to satisfy the “actual
123
innocence” standard for intentional murder. The new records
diagnosed petitioner with “Chronic Brain Syndrome Associated with
124
Other new
Convulsive Disorder with Behavioral Reaction.”
evidence included a psychologist’s evaluation concluding that
petitioner suffered from an “Organic Brain Syndrome” and “Post
125
Traumatic Stress Disorder due to past physical and sexual abuse.”
Petitioner argued that the above evidence demonstrated his inability
to “form[] the requisite mental intent to be guilty of murder.”126 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this claim, however,
explaining that “the mere presentation of new psychological
evaluations . . . does not constitute a colorable showing of actual
127
innocence.” The court reasoned that psychologists may disagree on
what constitutes a mental illness, and defendants would likely seek
out psychologists who would render a favorable examination.128
Evidently, most petitioners cannot obtain the same degree of
compelling new evidence that the Supreme Court was willing to
accept as demonstrating “actual innocence” in House. This is a
disconcerting consequence of efforts like the SPA. Most prisoners
held in violation of the Constitution will lack overwhelming evidence
of actual innocence and therefore will be unable to meet such an
onerous standard.129
B. The Streamlined Procedures Act Would Leave Victims of
Constitutional Violations Without Remedies
Even if the SPA would have effectively streamlined the
interpretation of habeas doctrine, it still would have yielded the
undesirable effect of streamlining processes designed to preserve
constitutional protections. The most troubling aspect of the SPA was
the Act’s potential substantive effect of allowing constitutional

123. Id. at 963–64.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 964–65.
126. Id. at 965.
127. Id. (quoting Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1516 (9th Cir. 1990)).
128. Id.
129. See Vivian Berger, Streamlining Injustice, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at 23 (“The
proverbial camel could have navigated the needle’s eye more easily than a prisoner will be able
to satisfy this provision.”); Coyle, supra note 83 (quoting Bryan Stevenson of the Equal Justice
Initiative in Montgomery, AL, contending that “[e]ssentially [the SPA] would end federal
habeas corpus for almost everyone in prison with the exception of a very, very small number”).
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violations to go unremedied. By requiring petitioners to effectively
prove their actual innocence, the Act foreclosed the ability to attain
habeas relief by demonstrating cause and prejudice. Thus, in addition
to overturning decades of Supreme Court precedent, the SPA would
have had the procedural effect of denying review in various
circumstances when it had been previously, and rightfully, granted.
1. The Right to Effective Counsel. Specifically, the cause and
prejudice exception has been used repeatedly as an avenue for
exercising basic constitutional rights, such as the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.130 The Sixth Amendment, defining the basic
components of a fair trial, expressly includes this right in the Counsel
131
Clause. The Supreme Court has recognized that this vital safeguard
exists “in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”132 Such
a fair trial can only be rendered truly fair if constitutional rights are
honored, whether the petitioner is guilty or innocent. Furthermore, in
Strickland v. Washington,133 the Supreme Court cautioned that the
mere presence of a trial attorney beside the accused does not satisfy
134
the Sixth Amendment. Precisely, “the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel.”135 This right is denied when

130. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984) (“The purpose of the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in
counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance under the Constitution.”).
131. The Counsel Clause provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the [s]tate and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
132. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684; see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368 (1993)
(applying Strickland); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (holding that the
appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants is a fundamental right); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938) (holding that a criminal defendant’s right to assistance of
counsel is “one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure
fundamental human rights of life and liberty”), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
133. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
134. Id. at 685.
135. Id. at 686 (emphasis added) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)).
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136
defense counsel fails to provide “adequate legal assistance.” The
Strickland Court articulated a two-pronged test to determine when
defense counsel’s performance was so inadequate that it warrants
137
reversal of the conviction, requiring the petitioner to demonstrate
(1) that counsel’s assistance was deficient,138 and (2) that counsel’s
assistance prejudiced the defense.139 Strickland’s “ineffective
assistance” test has been applied in countless court decisions that
140
subsequently reaffirmed the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Notably, the SPA sought to repeal this sequence of judicial
affirmations. The Act expressly amended habeas doctrine by stating
that “[a] court . . . shall not have jurisdiction to consider . . . any claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel related to such [procedurally
141
barred state] claim[s].” Even absent this explicit restriction, the SPA
would likely have eliminated these claims through its requirement
that a petitioner demonstrate actual innocence in order to attain
habeas relief. Yet if petitioners cannot initially argue a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, they may be unaware of what other
legal errors have emerged during trial. Subsequently, it may be
impossible, in some cases, for a petitioner to prove actual innocence
without first demonstrating prejudice caused by counsel’s defective
performance. This fatal flaw was addressed before the Senate
Judiciary Committee during hearings on the Act.142 Barry Scheck,
cofounder of the Innocence Project, asserted that this is “exactly why
so many innocence cases do not start out presenting innocence claims
at all, but rather procedural due process violations, and proof of
innocence only emerges once the rubble of other legal errors has

136. Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)); id. (“The benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.”)
137. Id. at 687.
138. See id. (“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”).
139. See id. (“This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”).
140. E.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500
(2003); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
141. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. § 4(h)(1) (2005).
142. See Bergman, supra note 93, at 4 (“[T]he wrongly convicted ordinarily cannot prove
their innocence until they have competent counsel . . . and perhaps most important of all, a full
and fair hearing on the merits of their procedural due process claims . . . .”).
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143
been swept aside.” By destroying the means to “sweep aside” the
procedural legal errors, the SPA effectively would have denied
prisoners the means to prove their actual innocence.144
This would have devastating implications for underprivileged
petitioners. Prisoners held in violation of their constitutional rights,
and without the means to secure quality defense, would be held
accountable for the defective performance of their attorneys.
Concededly, attorneys generally serve as agents of the accused. It is
not always appropriate, however, to bind defendants by their
attorneys’ poor strategic choices, particularly when such choices are
“so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair [and reliable] trial.”145
Left without a remedy, defendants face imprisonment in violation of
146
their constitutional rights. The SPA left no avenue for relief in these
instances. Instead, in its pursuit for finality, Congress would have
bound petitioners to state court convictions from trials which were
neither full nor fair.147
As a practical matter, the Act would have required federal courts
to tolerate deprivations of this right in the most extraordinary of
148
instances in which it was once afforded. For example, in Williams v.
149
Taylor, defense counsel failed to investigate and present substantial
mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury about defendant’s
“mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during his early childhood” and
testimony that defendant was “borderline mentally retarded.”150
Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith,151 counsel failed to thoroughly
investigate defendant’s sordid background, and thus did not present

143. Id.
144. See Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369 (“‘[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is
recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to
receive a fair trial.’” (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984))).
145. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
146. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 909 (explaining that the bypass test “refuses to
credit what is essentially a lawyer’s mistake as a forfeiture of constitutional rights”).
147. See Bergman, supra note 93, at 4 (“What this bill would do is speed up the execution of
men and women who did not have the resources or competent counsel to prove that they
were . . . innocent.”).
148. See Coyle, supra note 83 (“According to the ABA, a federal court would have to accept
at face value a state court’s decision . . . that the prisoner or his attorney failed to comply with [a
procedural] requirement, and that, in consequence, the state court declined to consider the
prisoner’s federal claim.”).
149. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
150. Id. at 370.
151. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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152
The
available mitigating evidence at his client’s sentencing.
Supreme Court stated that such representation “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.”153 Regardless of whether
petitioners are actually innocent, “all persons, even those who have
been convicted, are entitled to claim the benefits of constitutional
rules.”154 Under the SPA, however, the Court would have been
required to tolerate such unreasonableness and deny relief to
“victims” of such deficient representation. Thus, proposals like the
SPA would strip the Court of its power to safeguard the Sixth
155
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

2. The SPA Endangered Other Constitutional Rights. The SPA
jeopardized other constitutional rights as well. For example, the Act
provided no relief to petitioners whose jury selection was tainted by
racial bias,156 compromising constitutional protections. The Supreme
Court has held that, when a state court tries a defendant before a jury
from which members of defendant’s race have been purposefully
excluded, the trial may violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
157
Protection Clause. Under established habeas doctrine, a petitioner
may demonstrate that the trial prosecutor “perverted” use of the
peremptory challenge system during the trial by intentionally
objecting to the seating of jurors of the same race as the petitioner.158
Although peremptory challenges remain a viable jury selection tool
for other purposes, “[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude

152. Id. at 522.
153. Id. at 521.
154. Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 368; see also id. (noting that habeas review is necessary to
“correct constitutional mistakes”).
155. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (“[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure
that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of
fact.”); see also id. (“[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas review] is not the petitioners’
innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been
preserved.”).
156. See Ira Reiner, Legal Railroading Disguised as Efficiency, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at
B11 (“The Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005 . . . would not . . . allow for review . . . when a
conviction was tainted by racial bias in jury selection.”).
157. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
158. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965) (describing how a petitioner may raise
an inference of “purposeful discrimination” by showing that the prosecutor has been repeatedly
“responsible for the removal of [qualified blacks] who have survived challenges for cause, with
the result that no [blacks] ever served on petit juries”), overruled on other grounds by Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–94 (1986) (describing
how a defendant may establish a prima facie case of this violation).
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black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness
159
of our system of justice.”
Even though the SPA did not explicitly strip federal courts of the
power to review jury bias claims—unlike its treatment of ineffective
160
assistance claims —this would be a likely result of such legislation.
By removing the availability of the cause and prejudice exception,
federal courts would have no authority to remedy violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection unless petitioners
can prove they are actually innocent. Thus, again the SPA sought
expedience at the expense of important constitutional safeguards.
The SPA would have similarly limited Sixth Amendment
protections contained in the Confrontation Clause, which provides
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
161
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The
Supreme Court has continuously affirmed the significance of the
ability to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses162 to ensure
163
“the accuracy of the truth-determining process.” Although the
Court has noted that this protection is not absolute and “may, in
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in
the criminal trial process,”164 the SPA would have forced the
Confrontation Clause to bow permanently to the Act’s goal of
finality.
By limiting protection of the right to confront witnesses, the SPA
would have opened the door for harrowing consequences that
undermine the very purpose of the Confrontation Clause. The
drafters of the Constitution included the right to confront witnesses in
the Sixth Amendment to protect against controversial examination
procedures, the most notable being those used in political trials in

159. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
160. See Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088 § 4(h)(1) (2005) (removing federal
jurisdiction to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the state expressly waives
the restriction); see also supra Part III.B.1.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
162. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that when the defendant
lacked the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness, the exclusion of such critical
evidence, added to the state’s refusal to permit questioning, denied the defendant “a trial in
accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process”).
163. Id. at 295; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (discussing this
“bedrock procedural guarantee”).
164. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295.
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165
166
16th and 17th century England. In Crawford v. Washington,
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, recounted the controversial 1603
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, and concluded that the framers sought to
167
prevent such abuses when drafting the Confrontation Clause. In
that case, Raleigh’s accomplice in his alleged treason implicated him
in both a letter and an examination before the Privy Council.168 These
accusations were read at Raleigh’s trial, and the court rejected
Raleigh’s demands to have his accomplice testify, and hopefully
recant his accusations, in the courtroom.169 The jury convicted Raleigh
and sentenced him to death, despite Raleigh’s protests that he was
170
being tried “by the Spanish Inquisition.” To stem such abuses, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment must be interpreted to prevent
171
the use of ex parte examinations against the defendant.
Disturbingly, the SPA would have reduced federal courts’ ability
to protect against these evils. When a petitioner alleges violation of
172
this “bedrock” right in the event of a procedurally defaulted claim,
violation of this Sixth Amendment right may go unremedied under
such a proposal unless the petitioner can prove actual innocence.
Years of judicial development of Confrontation Clause doctrine
would be squandered as the rights ensured thereby would become
effectively “rights without remedies.” The confrontation right would
still exist, but there would be no teeth for enforcing this protection in
instances of procedural default. Further, when coupled with the lack
of availability of ineffectual assistance claims, many petitioners might
be unaware that such a right exists.

3. The SPA Would Provide No Remedies for Exceptional State
Law Abuses. In certain instances, courts grant habeas relief even
when the specific procedural default does not rise to the level of
constitutional violation, using the cause and prejudice standard. For
example, in Murray v. Carrier, the Supreme Court refused to create
an “exhaustive catalog” of adequate “objective impediments,” yet
165. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (“The most notorious of civil-law examinations occurred in
the great political trials of the 16th and 17th centuries.”)
166. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
167. Id. at 44.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 50.
172. Id. at 42.
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noted that “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was
not reasonably available to counsel . . . or that ‘some interference by
officials’ . . . made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause
173
under this standard.” The reasonable unavailability of a claim
defeats the concern of “sandbagging” that the Court earlier expressed
in Wainwright v. Sykes.174
This exception should also be made available because legal
concepts tend to mature slowly, “finding partial acceptance in some
courts while meeting rejection in others.”175 Therefore, it is not logical
to assume, or require, that attorneys are aware of all constitutional
questions that have yet to fully develop. Moreover, if courts were to
hold otherwise and make attorneys accountable for novel issues, this
may “actually disrupt state-court proceedings by encouraging defense
counsel to include any and all remotely plausible constitutional claims
that could someday gain recognition.”176 This could undermine the
SPA’s very purpose of accelerating judicial process.
Furthermore, to deny habeas relief when government agents
interfered with procedural efforts would unequivocally violate the
habeas doctrine’s goal of fundamental fairness. For example, in Dowd
177
v. United States ex rel. Cook, the Supreme Court held that when
prison officials had prevented a prisoner from sending out his appeal
documents, the prisoner was not barred from seeking habeas relief.178
Even when the restrictions were revoked by a new prison warden, the
179
prisoner’s claims were not procedurally barred. The Supreme Court
reiterated that interference by law enforcement officials is sufficient
180
to constitute cause. The alternative would lead to absurdly unjust
and troubling consequences. Proposals like the SPA may essentially
produce this horrific result, by removing cause and prejudice as an
avenue for relief.

173. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
174. See supra note 86; see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1984) (noting that if a
constitutional claim is unavailable, “it is safe to assume that . . . we cannot attribute to [counsel]
strategic motives of any sort”).
175. Reed, 468 U.S. at 15.
176. Id. at 16–17.
177. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
178. Id. at 208–09.
179. Id.
180. E.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991), superseded by statute, AEDPA of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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Finally, successors to the SPA might require federal courts to
ignore individual cases in which a state trial court “exorbitantly”
181
applied the law. For instance, in Lee v. Kemna, a Missouri trial
court heard a murder case in which the defendant had planned an
alibi defense that he was in California with his family at the time of
the murder.182 Yet the alibi witnesses had left the courthouse, a
183
development unanticipated by the defense. Defense counsel moved
for a continuance until the following morning to locate the alibi
witnesses and enforce the subpoena.184 The trial judge denied the
request, however, explaining that he would not be in court the next
day because “my daughter is going to be in the hospital all
day . . . [s]o I’ve got to stay with her.”185 The judge also denied defense
counsel’s request for a postponement until the following business day,
stating that he had another trial set for that day.186 The defendant was
convicted.187 On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, ruling that the defendant failed to comply with a state law
that required continuance requests to be made in writing and
accompanied by affidavits.188
The U.S. Supreme Court noted, on habeas review, that
“[o]rdinarily, violation of ‘firmly established and regularly followed’
state rules . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal
claim.”189 The petitioner’s case nevertheless fit within a “limited
category” of exceptional cases in which “exorbitant application” of a
190
state rule renders the state ground inadequate to bar habeas review.
Compliance with the Missouri state rule requiring written
continuance requests would not have changed the outcome because
the judge denied the request for a “reason that could not have been
countered by a perfect motion for continuance.”191 Furthermore, the

181. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002).
182. Id. at 367.
183. Id. at 369.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 370.
187. Id. at 365.
188. Id. at 372.
189. Id. at 376.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 381 (noting that the judge’s stated reasons of his daughter’s hospitalization and
another scheduled trial would not have been affected by a continuance request precisely in
compliance with Missouri law).

03__HERTZ.DOC

1344

6/7/2007 4:13 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1319

Missouri law did not mandate “flawless compliance” with the state
192
rule in the unique circumstances of the case. Finally, given “the
realities of the trial,” the defendant substantially complied with the
193
state rule by explaining the reasons for his continuance request.
Although any other outcome of Lee would seem to deny the
petitioner a fair trial, the SPA left no room for such “exorbitant”
exceptions to apply. Thus, petitioners will be unarmed against abuse
by state courts unless they can somehow show actual innocence. For
example, in Lee, the petitioner would have likely failed because he
had no means to secure the critical alibi witnesses. Likewise, similarly
situated petitioners may be unable to demonstrate their innocence if
194
impeded by unlawful state court procedures.
CONCLUSION
The compromise of constitutional rights contemplated by the
SPA and its potential progeny may provide courts with gains in speed
and finality. In balancing fairness against efficiency, however,
Congress should generally favor the scrupulous protection of
constitutional rights over expediting the resolution of cases.
Otherwise, basic constitutional rights could be systematically denied
to a large segment of the population who may lack the knowledge or
resources to attain adequate representation.
Thus, Congress should allow federal courts to retain jurisdiction
over enforcing fundamental constitutional rights. As the Supreme
Court has held, “[t]here can be no doubt that in enacting § 2254,
Congress [expressly intended] to ‘interpose the federal courts
between the [s]tates and the people, as guardians of the people’s
federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action.’”195
To strip federal courts of this power leaves the Constitution without
teeth against state court abuse. Congress should reject any future
ideological successors to the Streamlined Procedures Act to avoid
“streamlining” procedures needed to preserve fundamental
constitutional protections.

192. Id. at 382.
193. Id.
194. See Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 367 (noting the importance of protecting constitutional
rights due to suspicion of the manner in which state courts consider federal constitutional
issues).
195. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).

